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Citizens Without a Forum: The Lack of an 
Appropriate and Consistent Remedy for 
United States Citizens Injured or Killed as 
the Result of Activity Above the Territorial 
Air Space 
JAMES A. BECKMAN* 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
It was supposed to have been the most heralded space shuttle mis-
sion to date.! A crew of six astronauts and one high school teacher2 
was ready to ride the space shuttle Challenger off into new heights of 
space exploration and achievement. On January 28, 1986, the space 
shuttle Challenger lifted idyllically off the launch pad, seemingly well 
on its way out of the sunny blue Florida sky and onwards to the 
heavens. Yet, seventy-four seconds later, the space shuttle unexpectedly 
exploded,3 killing all aboard.4 Approximately six months later, on July 
* Attorney, United States Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC; Admitted to Florida 
Bar (1993); LL.M. in In ternational & Comparative Law, with Academic Distinction, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington, DC (1998); J.D., Ohio State University College of Law, 
Columbus, (])hio (1993); B.A., Magna Cum Laude, University of Tampa, Tampa, Florida (1990). 
This article is dedicated to my wife, Maria Beckman, for her constant support and good humor 
and our friend, Mickey. 
1 See William D. Marbach, ~at Went Wrong? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 32. 
2 After months of extensive searching, NASA announced in July 1985 that it had selected 
Sharon Christa McAuliffe, a high school social studies teacher, to serve as the first civilian crew 
member aboard a space shuttle mission. John N. Wilford, Teacher is Picked for Shuttle Trip, N.Y. 
TIMES,July 20,1985, at 28. 
3 Even after watching the explosion live on television, many did not initially believe the space 
shuttle had exploded. At the Kennedy Space Center, McAuliffe's husband, two children and 
parents silently watched the Shuttle turn into a fireball. A NASA official walked up to them and 
said, 'The vehicle has exploded." The teacher's mother repeated the words as a question, "The 
vehicle has exploded?" Michael Seiler, Shuttle Explodes, All 7 Die, Teacher on Board as Challenger 
Blows up on Liftoff, Reagan Postpones Future Flights Pending a Probe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986 
(late edition), at 1. 
4 See William J. Broad, The Shuttle Explodes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at AI; see also Ed 
Magnuson, They Slipped the Surly Bonds of Earth to Touch the Face of God, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 
24. 
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15, 1986, Ms. Jane Smith, the widow of the Challenger's pilot, filed a 
claim for more than $15 million against the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration ("NASA"), claiming NASA was negligent in the 
launch.5 The families of the six other victims all filed claims against 
NASA soon thereafter. Ultimately, six claims were settled by the Justice 
Department to avoid "litigation;"6 however, the original suit by Ms. 
Smith was not settled and was eventually unsuccessful in litigation.7 
As space travel increases with the passing of each year,8 the Chal-
lenger accident serves as a poignant reminder of the need for consis-
tent and adequate legal remedies. Indeed, with over 1,200 satellites in 
orbit, 3,500 pieces of debris being tracked by the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command, and increased missions to outer space, 
some lawyers believe that the proliferation of outer space "torts" is only 
a matter of time.9 It is no wonder that it has been reported, as early as 
5 See Theresa M. Foley, Family of Challenger Pilot Files $15-Million Claim Against NASA, AVIA-
TION WEEK,July 21,1986, at 29. This claim was later defeated in litigation. See infra note 7. 
6 See Four Families Settle Claims Over Shuttle, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1986, at I; see also Justice 
Department Settles With Astronauts' Families, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 30, 1986, at 2. 
The military members' claims were technically deniable under the "Feres Doctrine," which is 
derived from a grouping of cases which prohibit service members from suing the Government 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") when the injuries suffered were "incident to service." 
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). Federal civilians are likewise "FECA barred" 
from suing the Government for tort injuries under the FTCA by virtue of the exclusive provisions 
of the Federal Employees Compensation Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1998). Upon reaching 
settlement in this case, a Justice Department spokesman stated that "the Department of Justice 
and the families are pleased that these settlements were achieved with concern for the dignity of 
all involved, and in a timely and nonadversarialmanner without the need to engage in litigation." 
Four Families Settle Claims Over Shuttle, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1986, at 1. It was later disclosed that 
the settlement to the families of the astronauts exceeded seven and a half million dollars. See 
Warren E. Leary, Families of 4 Astronauts Received $7.7 Million in Shuttle Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 1988, at 1. 
7 For further information regarding the denial of Ms. Smith's claim in litigation, see Court 
Refuses Challenger Pilot Case, UPI, Feb. 20,1990, at 2, in which it is reported that the U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to disturb a lower court decision that barred the family of Challenger space shuttle 
pilot Michael Smith from suing the government for wrongful death damages. 
8 Indeed, one need not look back far in the history of space exploration for an example of the 
perils of space travel. For example, on June 25, 1997, an unmanned cargo ship collided with Mir 
Space Station in outer space. The cargo ship smashed into the side of the Mir Station, draining 
all air pressure from the damaged section and forcing the crew to seal the section from the rest 
of the craft. After the collision, both of the oxygen generators aboard the ship failed. Addi tionally, 
before the crash, in February 1997, the Mir's crew experienced a fire onboard the ship which 
filled the craft with smoke and fumes. Any of these incidents could have resulted in the injury 
or death of the Mil' Station occupants, raising questions of compensation. See Craft That Hit Mir 
is Destroyed; Cargo Ship Burns Up In Atmosphere, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1997, at 9; Michael Specter, 
Principal Oxygen System Fails Aboard Calamity-Plagued Mir, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1997, at 1. 
9 See Margaret B. Carlson, Space Law Launches Increasing Number of Lawyers, LEGAL TIMEs,June 
14, 1982, at 10. 
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1983, that "space law opens a new frontier for Justice Department 
Attorneys. "10 
This article explores avenues of redress (or lack thereof) when a U.S. 
citizen is the victim of a tort committed by a sovereign state in outer 
space. Both international law and U.S. domestic law are examined. An 
analysis of liability under international law includes, at a minimum, an 
examination of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("1967 Outer Space Treaty"),11 the 
1972 Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by 
Space Objects ("1972 Convention on Liability"), 12 and the customary 
internationallawl3 doctrine of "diplomatic protection." The analysis of 
liability under U.S. domestic law includes an analysis of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") (for suits by U.S. citizen against U.S. Gov-
ernment) 14 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA") (for suits 
by U.S. citizens against foreign governments in U.S. federal court).15 
10 Mark A. Dombroff, Space Law Opens a New Frontier For Justice Department Attorneys, NAT'L 
LJ., May 23, 1983, at 24. 
11 Treaty on Principles Govel'lling the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 
205 [hereinafter "1967 Outer Space Treaty"]. As of January 1, 1997, this Treaty was in force for 
102 parties, including the United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9433, A LIST OF 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ONJANUARY 
1,1997439 (1997). 
12 Convention on Intel'llational Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 
24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter "1972 Convention on Liability"]. As ofJanualY 1, 
1997, this treaty was in force for 88 parties, including the United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 
supra note 11, at 439-40. 
13 Statute of the Intel'llational Court of Justice (ICJ), art. 38(1), which is binding on all 
signatories to the United Nations Charter pel' the U.N. Charter, defines customary law as being 
a part of international law. Al'licle 38 of the Statute of the ICJ states: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with intel'llational law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recogn ized by the con testin g states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation"). 
14 Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1998). 
15 Foreign Sovereign Iminunity Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611, as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 100-640, 102 Stat. 3333 (1997). 
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Ultimately, this article addresses whether current municipal law pro-
tections are adequate to protect u.s. citizens from damages caused via 
the negligence of government sponsored activities in outer space. Part 
II of this article defines the terms "air space" and "outer space" and 
describes the importance of this terminological distinction as it relates 
to the issue of compensation for torts occurring in outer space. Part 
III surveys the two major municipal law impediments to suing a sover-
eign in a court of the United States for outer space "torts," namely the 
FTCA and the FSIA. Part IV examines the international law compen-
sation scheme for damages to U.S. citizens caused by space travel 
activities, including application of the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space, the 
1972 Convention on Liability, and application of the customary inter-
national law principle of diplomatic protection. Part V analyzes the 
strengths and weaknesses of the foregoing legal regimes, discusses 
alternative theories of recovery, and proposes revisions to current 
municipal law so as to avoid the inequitable results which could result 
in cases involving tortious injury occurring in outer space. 
I. DISTINCTION BETWEEN "TERRITORIAL AIR SPACE" AND "OUTER 
SPACE" 
A preliminary discussion of the boundaries of "territorial air space" 
and "outer space" is essential in order to determine which legal regime 
(i.e., which set of municipal or international rules of compensation, 
or which combination) will apply in any given case. 16 At the outset, it 
should be recognized that the 1944 Chicago Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation,I7 as well as customary international law,18 clearly 
provides that every sovereign state has complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over the air space above its territory.19 This is a basic legal 
principle of international law and has been recognized and incorpo-
rated in U.S. municipal law as weII.20 As such, to the extent an accident 
16 See S.B. Rosenfield, The Need to Distinguish Air Space from Outer Space, 20 COLLOQUIUM L. 
OUTER SPACE 61 (1977). 
17 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
[hereinafter "Convention on International Civil Aviation"]. As of January 1, 1997, this Convention 
was in force for over 180 parties, including the United States. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 
11, at 379-80. 
18 See Statute of the IC], art. 38(1). 
19 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 17, alt. 1 ("The contracting States 
recognise that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its 
territory") . 
20 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. App. § 1508(a) (1993) ("The United States of America is declared to 
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occurred within a country's air space (as defined below), that country's 
domestic law would clearly apply to the incident by virtue of the 1944 
Chicago Convention. 
Prior to the advent of the space age, the above analysis adequately 
addressed any issue of a tort occurring anywhere in the air. That is, 
historically, the authority over the air space above a sovereign's terri-
tory was thought to extend from the ground up through the infinite 
reaches of space (usque ad coelum) .21 However, with the deployment of 
Sputnik into space, countries were forced to revisit the issue of pre-
cisely where territorial air space ends and outer space begins. 22 Thus, 
in recent years, due to immense strides in technology and space activi-
ties, the term "outer space" has been defined by treaty law as territory 
which is beyond the sovereign claim, laws, or control of anyone 
nation.23 Phrased another way, outer space is recognized as belonging 
to the common heritage of mankind and may not be acquired or 
appropriated by any nation. However, as international and domestic 
laws now recognize a legal distinction between "territorial air space" 
(under the control of the sovereign as part of its territory) and "outer 
space" (not under the control of any sovereign and considered inter-
national territory), the need to define the two areas/terms is impera-
tive.24 
possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space of the United 
States, including the air space above all inland waters and air space above those portions of the 
adjacent marginal high seas, bays, and lakes, over which by international law or treaty or conven-
tion the United States exercises national jurisdiction"), repealed July 5, 1994, by Pub. L. No. 
103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379. A more broad statement was replaced in its stead. See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40103 (1998). See also Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 151, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (noting 
that it is v.1thin the basic sovereignty of every nation to control the airspace over its territory). 
21 LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1993). 
22 Sputnik was launched into orbit by the then-Soviet Union on October 4,1957. See N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 1957, at 1. For initial legal international ramifications of Sputnik in this area, see Bin 
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant International CustomalY Law, 5 INDIAN 
J. INT'L L. 23 (1965); see also Robert L. Bridge, International Law and MilitalY Activities in Outer 
Space, 13 AKRON L. REv. 649 (1980). 
23 See 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note II, art. l. 
24 For a discussion of the various criteria of delimitation that have been proposed, see Barbara 
J. Rowbo, Airspace-Outer Space? The Geostationary Orbit and the Need for Precise Definition of Outer 
Space, 4 N .Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 115 (1982); He Qizhi, The Problem of Definition and 
Delimitation of Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 157 (1982); Michael J. Finch, Comment, Limited Space: 
Allocating the GeostationalY Ormt, 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 788 (Fall 1986); Bin Cheng, Legal 
Regime of Air Space and Outer Space: The Boundary Problem, Functionalism versus Spatialism: The 
Major Premises 5 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 323, 335-38 (1980); see also U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.\05/C.2/7 (1970). 
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The majority rule today, accepted by most nations, is that the bound-
ary between outer space and air space should be near the lowest 
altitude (perigee) at which artificial earth satellites can remain in orbit 
without being destroyed by friction with the air.25 To avoid a change in 
the law (as technology advances allowing for lower artificial satellites), 
it has been additionally proposed that the term "outer space" (as used 
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty) "includes all space at and above the 
lowest perigee achieved by ... 27 January 1967, when the treaty was 
opened for signature, by any satellite put into orbit, without prejudice 
to the question whether it mayor may not later be determined to 
include any part of space below such perigee. "26 
There have also been several competing minority views as to where 
outer space actually begins, to include starting at different points above 
the earth27 (Le., starting at a set distance above the earth) or using a 
"functional approach" to defining space (Le., resolution of issue, in 
part, depends on character of activity at issue).28 An example of the 
"functional approach" can be seen in the United States Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, which defines "space" as including "any vehicle 
used or designed in flight or navigation in space" and applies "while 
that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all external 
doors are closed on earth. "29 
The purpose here is not to enter the fray as to where the demarca-
tion of territorial air space and outer space ought to be, but rather to 
25 This would be approximately 90 kilometers above the surface of the earth. See Lubos Perek, 
Scientific Criteria for the Delimitation of Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. Ill, 118 (1977); see also Finch, 
supra note 24, at 794. 
26 INTERNATIONAL LAW AsSOCIATION, REpORT OF THE FIFTy-THIRD CONFERENCE BUENOS AIRES 
1968 xxii (L.C. Green ed., 1968). 
27 For instance, some have called for an approach based upon the theoretical limit of an 
airflight, rather than the lowest possible perigee rule of a satellite. For a review of the various 
theories regal'ding the demarcation, see John C. Kunich, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global 
Surviva~ 41 A.F. L. REv. 119, 130 (1997); Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space and Related 
Issues: Demilitarization of Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 93, 93-95 
(1985); J. Parkerson, International Legal Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 MIL. L.. 
REV. 81 (1987); see also, generally, HENKIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 1369. This would place the 
demarcation at approximately 84 km, rather than the 90 km based upon the perigee rule. See 
ANDREW HALEY, SPACE LAw AND GoVERNMENT 97 (1963). In 1978, the Soviet Union proposed a 
demarcation point at approximately 100-110 kilometers at the United Nations' Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). See Kunich, supra, at 129-30. The United States 
rejected these attempts to define "outer space" as beginning of any set distance above the earth. 
See id. at 130 n.39. 
28 See McDOUGAL ET AL., LAw AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE, 349-55 (1963). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1993). 
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offer a precise definition for later use throughout this article. In this 
vein, it is also important for the reader to note that the concern over 
the actual point of demarcation is not merely an esoteric or passing 
academic point. Rather, the issue is important as the rules for compen-
sation change remarkably depending on whether the injured party 
finds himself above or below the jurisdictional boundary line (i.e., in 
outer space or within a sovereign's territorial air space). For purposes 
of the remainder of this article, the article will utilize the majority rule, 
that the air space-outer space boundary exists at the lowest altitude 
(perigee) at which artificial earth satellites can remain in orbit without 
being destroyed by friction with the air (roughly 90 km above the 
surface of the earth). 
II. INDIVIDUAL SUITS BY U.S. CITIZENS: No ADEQUATE DOMESTIC 
REMEDY AVAILABLE 
A. Suits Against the United States Government in United States or 
Lesser Territorial Courts: Application of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
and the ''Foreign Country" Exception 
1. Overview of the FTCA and "Foreign Country Exception" 
Traditionally, the United States Government was immune to suit by 
its own citizens.30 The notion of absolute sovereign immunity from 
legal action of a sovereign's subjects had its roots in the English com-
mon law maxim that the "king can do no wrong"31 and may even have 
had its roots in feudallaws. 32 Mter over one hundred and fifty years of 
absolute immunity in the United States33 and countless private bills of 
30 SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 131, 1033 (5th ed. 
1984); see also Louis L. Jaffee, Suits Against Gavernments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963). 
31 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, at §§ 131, 1033; see also COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: 
THE TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITs OFFICIALS 43 (1979) (report may be obtained 
from the National Association of Attorneys General [NAAG], 750 First Street, N.E., Suite 1l00, 
Washington, DC 20002). 
32 In the thirteenth century, it was recognized that the King could not be sued in his own courts. 
CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 5 (1972). Blackstone 
later noted that no suit or action could be brought against the King, even in civil matters, because 
no court could have jurisdiction over him. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 255. 
331n 1834, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dictum that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
applied to the federal, as well as the state governments. United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 
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relief,34 the United States waived its immunity for liability in tort, and 
consented to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity as it relates to 
certain classes of claims alleging negligence made against it in the 
federal courts under the terms of the FCTA.35 Indeed, the Federal 
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act36 amended 28 
U .S.C. § 2879 of the FTCA to provide that the FTCA is the exclusive 
remedy for tort claims arising from actions taken by federal employees 
within the scope of their employment.37 As such, the FTCA is the 
exclusive and sole remedy available for injury caused by the negligent 
actions of the United States or its employees in outer space. 
Basically, the FTCA imposes liability on the United States for acts of 
its employees "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances. "38 Subject to certain exceptions 
and limitations, the FTCA provides for (1) the payment of money 
damages, for (2) injury or loss of either real or personal property or 
for personal injury or death, (3) caused by a wrongful or negligent act 
or omission, (4) of an employee of the United States, (5) acting within 
436 (1834). In a later case, the Court expressly held that "the government is not liable to be sued, 
except ,,~th its own consent, given by law." United States v. Elmore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286,287-88 
(1846). 
34 Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, in order to compensate a victim of a tort committed by 
the United States, the Congress of the United States would have to pass a private bill of relief. 
See 1 LESTER JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
§ 2.02 (1998). These bills of relief were drafted, debated, and passed just like any other piece of 
legislation. The time necessary to accomplish remuneration by this method was long and the 
process was onerous. Congress' desire to avoid this onerous process was one of the reasons behind 
enactment of the FTCA. See COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 31, 
at 43. Indeed, the statement of purposes for the FTCA included: 
(2) the need of the Congress to be relieved of the burden imposed by multitudinous 
bills for private relief arising from tort claims against government employees; 
(3) the advantage of an impartial jpdicial forum for both the complainant and the 
Government in which to discover the facts in the same manner as private law suits; 
(4) a desire of Congress to expedite the payment of just claims. 
Id. As an example as to the prevalence of these bills of relief, in each of the Seventy-fourth and 
Seventy-five Congresses over 2,300 private claim bills of relief were introduced, seeking more than 
$100,000,000.00. In the Seventy-seventh Congress, of the 1,829 private claims introduced and 
referred to the Claims Committee, 593 were approved for a total of $1,000,253.30. See H.R. REp. 
No. 1287, at 2 (1945). 
35 The FTCA was passed based upon "a desire on the part of the federal government in the 
interests of justice and fair play to permit a private litigant to satisty his legal claims for injury or 
damage suffered at the hands of a United States employee acting in the scope of employment." 
COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 31, at 43. 
36 Pub. L. No. 100-694. 
37 28 U.S.c. § 2679(b)(l) (1998). 
38Id. § 2674. 
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the scope of employment, (6) where the United States, if a private 
person, would be liable, (7) according to the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred.39 The Act also sets forth thirteen statutory 
exceptions, which act to prohibit recovery under the statute.40 
As stated above, however, Congress did not waive the sovereign 
immunity entirely. Rather, Congress adopted thirteen specific excep-
tions within the body of the FTCA, which, if applicable, act as a bar to 
suit against the United States under the ITCA. As it relates to the 
subject of this article (Le., governmental activities in outer space), the 
"foreign country" exception is the germane provision which would be 
raised in defense of liability if the United States were sued under the 
FTCA for a tort occurring in outer spaceY The "foreign country" 
exception to the FTCA provides, in essence, that the United States 
cannot be sued for, and has not waived its sovereign immunity to, suits 
arising in a "foreign country. "42 That is, under the "foreign country" 
exception, the United States is not liable for accidents which occur 
within the territory of a "foreign country. "43 While the term "foreign 
country" remains undefined in the text of the FTCA, the legislative 
history of the exception appears to support the conclusion that the 
chief concern of the section was to prevent the United States govern-
ment from being liable pursuant to the laws of another nation. 44 That 
is, according to the basic terms of the FTCA, the situs of the accident 
dictates what law applies in defining the government's negligence.45 As 
such, Congress saw the need for a "foreign country" exception so that 
the United States would not be subject to the laws of hundreds of 
39 In order to file suit under the FTCA, certain procedural steps must be taken. Namely, the 
plaintiff must first file an administrative claim with the agency that allegedly committed the wrong. 
Mter submitting the claim, the claimant must allow the agency at least six months to adjudicate 
the claim before filing a lawsuit against the United States in United States District Court. See id. 
§ 2675(b). 
40 These exceptions are contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1998). 
41 [d. § 2680(k). 
42 [d. 
43 See, e.g., Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46 (5th Cir. 1995); Grunch v. United States, 538 F. 
Supp. 534 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
44 For a good exposition of the "foreign country" exception, see Mark Dean, Note, Smith v. 
United States:Justice Denied Under the FTCA ''Foreign Country" Exception, 38 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 553 
(1993-1994). Mr. Dean convincingly writes that the legislative history behind the "foreign coun-
try" exception establishes that Congress was concerned with preventing the United States gov-
ernment from being liable pursuant to the laws of another count?). See id. at 561. Mr. Dean 
concludes that the "foreign country" exception should not apply to sovereignless regions like 
Antarctica and Outer Space. See id. at 584. 
45 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1998); see also Frazier v. United States, 412 F.2d 22,23 (6th Cir. 1969). 
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different legal systems and concepts of jurisprudence. As the Supreme 
Court noted, Congress was simply "unwilling to subject the United 
States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power."46 
Although there have been a bevy of cases dealing with the "foreign 
country" exception in regards to incidents occurring on land subject 
to the jurisdiction of another country, on land subject to United Na-
tions trusteeships supervision,47 in air space over foreign countries,48 in 
American embassies,49 on military bases,5o and on war time acquisi-
tions,51 none of these cases specifically dealt with regions where no 
other foreign law would be applicable in the case. This is especially 
relevant because, as stated above, Congress enacted the "foreign coun-
try" exception to the FICA so that the United States would not be held 
liable pursuant to the laws of another nation. As outer space, the high 
seas, and Antarctica52 are neither "foreign countries" nor governed by 
"foreign law," these areas would seemingly fall outside of the purview 
of this exception. Indeed, prior to 1993, at least one court actually held 
that the "foreign country" exception did not bar tort actions based 
upon incidents occurring on the high seas or in aircraft flying over the 
high seas, as no other foreign law applied.53 
Perhaps in light of the above, and because there was no serious con-
tention that "foreign law" applied in outer space54 (i.e., because of basic 
international law tenants described above), legal scholars thought that 
46 United Statesv. SpeJar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949). 
47 Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1958). 
48 See Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y 1959). 
49 See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1954). 
50 See SPelar, 338 U.S. at 22l. 
51 See Callas, 253 F.2d at 838. 
52 The Antarctica Treaty specifies that no party to the agreement may assert a claim of sover-
eignty over any portion of the continent while the Treaty is in effect. Antartica Treaty, Dec. I, 
1959, art. IV, t I, 12 U.S.T. 794, 796; 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 74. 
53 See Blumenthal v. United States, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962). 
54 See, e.g., Joseph Bosco, Liability of the United States Government far Outer Space Activities which 
Result in Injuries, Damages or Death According to United States National Law, 51]. AIR L. & COM. 
809, 827 (1986); see also Larry Kaplan, Space-Specific Remedies far Torts in Outer Space: What Path 
Will United States Law Follow?, 22 INT'L LAw 1145, 1153 (1988). Mr. Kaplan writes that it was 
improbable that courts ''would ever refuse to entertain lawsuits that allege space torts even though 
no federal space code exists. Whether appropriate or not, no court has yet seen fit to dismiss a 
case on the theory that there is no law that is applicable to actions arising in outer space." Id.; 
see also Dombroff, supra note 10, at 24;Joseph Bosco, The United States Government as Defendant-
One Example of the Need far a Unifarm Liability Regime to Govern Outer Space and Space-Related 
Activities, 15 PEPP. L. REv. (1988); Barton Showalter, In Space, Nobody Can Hear You Scream 
"Tort!, .. 58]. AIR L. & COM. 795 (1993). 
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the FTCA would therefore allow claims arising in outer space on the 
theory that the FTCA was intended to cover unique and unprece-
dented forms of liability, and no foreign law would be applicable to the 
incident at issue.55 Even if the FTCA did not technically apply, other 
scholars thought that courts would allow suits under the FTCA on 
grounds of fairness alone.56 However, the Supreme Court's exegesis in 
Smith v. United States (discussed below) has thrown the whole idea of 
compensation under the FTCA for outer space "torts" into serious 
question. 57 
2. Outer Space is a "Foreign Country" Under the FTCA 
In Smith, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide whether 
a region not owned or subject to foreign law (e.g., a region such as 
outer space) constitutes a "foreign country" under the FTCA.58 That 
is, the Court was faced with the issue as to whether the "foreign 
country" exception would bar an otherwise meritorious suit against the 
United States under the FTCA, even though the incident giving rise to 
the claim did not occur within the jurisdiction of another foreign 
sovereign. Hence, in order to understand fully why a U.S. citizen 
cannot recover against the United States for injuries due to the negli-
gence of the United States for incidents involving clear liability above 
the territorial air space of the United States, an analysis of Smith is 
necessary. 
The facts underlying Smith are as follows. On November 23, 1986, 
John Emmett Smith fell into a crevasse in Antarctica after straying off 
the approved path leading to and from the McMurdo Station, a facility 
operated by the United States in Antarctica.59 Mr. Smith died as a result 
of exposure and internal injuries he suffered as a result of the fall into 
the crevasse. Subsequently, his widow, Ms. Sandra Jean Smith, filed a 
wrongful death action under the FTCA, claiming negligence on the 
part of the United States for its failure to warn U.S. citizens at 
55 "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." 
1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note II, art. II. 
56 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
57 507 U.S. 197 (1993). 
58 See id. 
59 McMurdo is the largest American base and logistics facility in Antarctica. John Smith was a 
contract worker for a private corporation employed at the McMurdo station. See Smith v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. 1480, 1483 (D. Or. 1989). 
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McMurdo Station of the dangerous conditions present in Antarctica 
generally, and of the approved path specifically.GO 
At the time Ms. Smith filed a claim against the United States under 
the FTCA, only one other case, Beattie v. United States, dealt directly 
with the application of the FTCA to Antarctica.61 In Beattie, an Air New 
Zealand aircraft crashed into Mount Erebus, Antarctica, killing all 
aboard.62 The families of the victims filed a wrongful death action 
claiming the United States was negligent in the selection, training, and 
supervision of air traffic personnel at McMurdo base, the same base 
involved in Ms. Smith's complaint in Smith.63 In Beattie, the Govern-
ment moved to dismiss, claiming that Antarctica was a "foreign coun-
try" for purposes of the FTCA. However, the Circuit Court for the 
Oistrict of Columbia disagreed, holding that Antarctica was not a "for-
eign country" at all. Importantly, the court stated: "Antarctica is not a 
foreign coun try; it is not a country at all; and it is not under the domi-
nation of any other foreign nation or country. "64 Further, in closing the 
court stated: "All this attempted limitation of coverage rests on one 
indefensible concept-that Antarctica is a 'foreign country' ... Ant-
arctica is an area without any law whatsoever."65 Thus, in Beattie, the 
court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed against the United States under 
the FTCA, as the "foreign country" exemption was inapplicable.66 
Despite the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Beattie, the Oregon district 
court67 dismissed Ms. Smith's complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, holding that her claim was barred by the "foreign country" 
exception.68 The court specifically held that Section 2680(k) of the 
FTCA mandated the dismissal of this claim as the FTCA precluded the 
exercise of jurisdiction over "any claim arising in a foreign country. "69 
60 Ms. Smith specifically alleged the U.S. was negligent in failing to provide adequate waming 
of the dangers posed by crevasses in areas beyond the marked paths. See Smith, 507 U.S. at 199. 
61 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
62 See id. at 93. 
63 See id. at 93-94; see also Smith, 702 F. Supp. at 1483. 
64 Beattie, 756 F.2d at 94 (quoting district court opinion in case) (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at lO5--O6. 
66The Beattie decision would have been relevant to incidents of liability occurring in outer 
space as well. First, the court in Beattie applied the FTCA to Anartica, a territory similal' to outel' 
space in that both are sovereignless international territories. Second, Judge Wilkey, who wrote 
the Beattie decision, analogized Antarctica to outer space in the decision. See Beattie, 756 F.2d at 
99-100. 
67 See Smith, 702 F. Supp. at 1482-83. Ms. Smith resided in Oregon at the time of the accident. 
Id. at 1483. 
68 See id. at 1482-83; see also Smith, 507 U.S. at 199-200. 
69 Smith, 702 F. Supp. at 1483. 
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Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court and placed particular emphasis on the dissenting analysis 
of then Judge Scalia in Beattie. As the Ninth Circuit's decision directly 
conflicted with the D.C. Circuit decision in Beattie, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the split between the circuits.70 
In ultimately affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision and holding that 
any "sovereignless region" of the universe would constitute a "foreign 
country" for purposes of the FTCA, the Court analyzed the actual 
language of the "foreign country" exception, the FICA choice of law 
provisions, and the FTCA venue provisions. 71 Under this analysis, as 
the Court quickly determined that the text of the FICA was silent as 
to the definition of a "foreign country," the Court then turned to its 
canons of statutory construction.72 In doing so, the Court first looked 
to the dictionary meaning of the word "country," which the Court 
determined could reasonably be defined as "a region or tract of land. "73 
Despite the obvious possibility of alternative definitions,74 the Court 
continued its analysis by stating that the "ordinary meaning" of the 
language itself, "we think, includes Antarctica, even though it has no 
recognized government. "75 The Court also stated that the "common-
sense" meaning of the term undermines attempts to link it exclusively 
to the notion that the land must be tied or controlled by some sover-
eign state.76 The Court then determined, via a statutory analysis, that 
by this definition, the term "foreign country" would include Antarctica, 
even though Antarctica is not a "country" per se, or controlled by any 
foreign power. 77 
The Court next determined that the "foreign country" exception 
must include Antarctica, because holding otherwise would be inc on-
70 See Smith, 507 u.s. at 197. 
71 See 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b) (choice-of-Iaw provision) & 28 u.s.c. § 1402(b) (venue provision). 
72 See Smith, 507 u.s. at 201-03. 
73 [d. at 201. 
74 The majority did recognize the possibility of a different definition, stating "to be sure, this 
is not the only possible interpretation of the term, and it is therefore appropriate to examine 
other parts of the statute before making a final determination." [d. at 201. 
75 [d. 
76 See id. 
77 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 201. As one author points out, including Antarctica as a "foreign 
country" goes against other legislation which used the term "foreign country." See Dean, supra 
note 44, at 560-72. The author convincingly argues, that in many other pieces of the federal 
legislation, the term "foreign country" includes only areas outside the United States that are 
under the sovereign control or dominion of some other state. See id. at 583. The author concludes 
that Antarctica would not be considered a "foreign country" under these prior congressional 
definitions and prior court decisions. See id. at 583. 
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sistent with other provisions of the FTCA.78 By this it was meant that 
holding otherwise, would make the venue and choice oflaw provisions 
of the FTCA nonsensical. The Court pointed to the FTCA choice of 
law provision (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)), and commented that: 
[I]f Antarctica were not a "foreign country," and for the 
reason included with the FTCA's coverage, § 1346(b) would 
instruct courts to look to the law of a place that has no law 
in order to determine the liability of the United States-
surely a bizarre result. 79 
The Court then pointed out that a strict reading of the venue provision 
would also be nonsensical if the FTCA were applied to a sovereignless 
region like Antarctica. The venue provision80 provides that claims un-
der the FTCA may be brought "only in the judicial district where the 
plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of oc-
curred. "81 The Court viewed this as nonsensical because the FTCA 
would then establish jurisdiction for all tort claims against the United 
States arising in Antarctica, but no venue would exist unless the claim-
ant happened to reside in the United States. This, the Court stated, 
would create a "venue gap" and the Court would, therefore, "prefer 
the construction that avoids leaving such a gap . . . . "82 Finally, the 
Court concluded by noting that the Court favors the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of statutes83 (unless so explicitly 
delineated) and the requirement that the Court extinguish any linger-
ing doubt regarding the reach of the FTCA against extraterritorial 
application.84 
Thus, the majority's opinion can be characterized as a strict reading 
or construction of the statute85 to resolve the question as to what was 
78 Namely, the choice of law and venue provisions within the FICA. See supra note 71. 
79 Smith, 507 U.S. at 201-02. 
80 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1998). 
81Id. 
82 Smith, 507 U.S. at 203 (citation and internal quotation omitted). 
83 See id. at 202-05. 
84 See id. at 204-05. 
85 A little more to the point, Justice Stevens in his dissent called the majority's reading of the 
FICA as a "parsimonious" construction of the statute. Id. at 205. A commentator has likewise 
called the majority's statutory application "wooden." Lauren S. Bornemann, This is Ground 
Control to Majar Tom... Your Wife Would Like to Sue But There is Nothing We Can Do ... The 
Unlikelihood That The FTCA Waives Sovereign Immunity For Tarts Committed l7y United States 
Emplayees in Outer Space: A Call far Preemptive Legislation, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 517, 539 (1998) 
("The Supreme Court went to extraordinary lengths in Smith to put select words of the FICA in 
1999) AIR SPACE FORUM 263 
meant by the "foreign country" exception.8G The dissent, on the other 
hand, believed the majority's construction directly contravened the 
long jurisprudential history relating to the negligence of federal agents 
on the sovereignless high seas and the original background to the 
FTCA at the time it was enacted. That is, Justice Stevens' argument 
rested on the fact that when the ITCA was enacted in 1946, neither 
the Suits in Admiralty Act nor the Public Vessels Act allowed for claims 
against the Government for negligence on the high seas.87 Justice 
Stevens went on to point out that the FTCA covered negligence actions 
on the high seas prior to the 1960 amendment of the Suits in Admiralty 
Act which brought all maritime torts under the Act and outside the 
ITCA.88 Hence,Justice Stevens characterized the majority'S opinion as 
"untenable" because the FTCA did cover the "sovereignless reaches of 
the high seas" prior to 1960.89 More importantly, the dissent believed 
that the majority's "parsimonious" construction of the FTCA was in-
consistent with the overriding purpose and intent of the ITCA: 
The wisdom that prompted the Court's grant of certiorari is 
not reflected in its interpretation of the 1946 Act. Rather, it 
reflects a vision that would exclude electronic eavesdropping 
from the coverage of the Fourth Amendment and satellites 
from the coverage of the Commerce Clause. The interna-
tional community includes sovereignless places but no places 
where there is no rule of law. Majestic legislation like the 
Federal Tort Claims Act should be read with the vision of the 
judge, enlightened by an interest in justice, not through the 
opaque green eye-shade of the cloistered bookkeeper.9o 
Justice Stevens also correctly foresaw the problem this "narrow" ruling 
created with the advent of the space age. Stevens wrote poignantly that 
the majority was wrong 
not only because its answer identifies the character of our 
concern about ordinary justice, but also because Antarctica 
a context that would justify its ruling. Its wooden application of 'statutory norms of construction' 
to arrive at an in terpretation that diametrically differs fwm that of most other courts seems to 
indicate a fundamental belief on its part that the United States should not be liable for the 
damages it causes if it can avoid that liability"). 
86 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 203. 
87 See id. at 208-10 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
88 See id. at 207-10 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
89 See id. at 209 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
90 [d. at 216-17 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
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is just one of three vast sovereignless places where the negli-
gence of federal agents may cause death or physical injury. 
The negligence that is alleged in this case will surely have its 
parallels in outer space as our astronauts continue their explora-
tions oj ungoverned regions Jar beyond the jurisdictional bounda-
ries that were Jamiliar to the Congress that enacted the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946.91 
The ramifications of Smith are now indeed far reaching,92 Clearly, 
absent statutory revisions, the ITCA can no longer be said to apply in 
any sovereignless region.93 One author has aptly captured the problem 
with the majority's holding by stating that "no court will ever reach the 
question of who-if anyone-was responsible for Mr. Smith's death. 
Mrs. Smith is a widow without a forum. "94 Clearly, as a result of Smith, 
the FTCA can no longer be considered to be an adequate remedy for 
U.S. citizens injured in outer space by the United States, despite earlier 
thoughts to the contrary. Thus, due to the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Smith, any U.S. citizen who is injured due to the negligence of the 
United States in outer space would be barred from recovery under the 
FTCAY5 To utilize the example of the space shuttle Challenger men-
tioned at the onset of this article, ifthe United States refused to provide 
compensation in the administrative claim stage, and the accident oc-
curred today (Le., after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. US.), 
the family of Sharon Christa McAuliffe would have been barred from 
recovery under the FTCA. Mr. McAuliffe would have been a widower 
without a forum. 96 
91Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
92 See, e.g., David Stewart, Out in the Cold, 79 A.B.A.]. 44 Gune 1993) ("The remaining question, 
of course, is why the justices chose to hear this particular case ... perhaps the answer is that the 
justices have adopted the Star Trek creed, resolving 'to boldly go where no man has gone 
before.'''). 
93 See Bornemann, supra note 85, at 539. 
94Jonathan Blum, The Deep Freeze: Torts, Choice of Law, and the Antarctica Treaty Regime, 8 
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 667, 669 (1994). 
95 One author, in discussing the criminal law implications of the 'jurisdictional vacuum" of 
Antarctica, stated that Antarctica "is the place to murder your mother-in-law". Robert Reinhold, 
In International Law, Antarctica is a Twilight Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Mal: 14, 1982, at 9. 
96 For actual settlements in the case, see supra note 6. 
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B. Suits Against Foreign Countries by US. Citizens in US. Courts:97 An 
Application oj the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act oj 1976 
In 1976, the United States enacted the FSIA to cover the jurisdic-
tional grounds for suing a sovereign state98 in U.S. courts. That is, just 
as the FTCA provides the exclusive framework for suing the United 
States for negligence, the FSIA provides the exclusive framework for 
suing other sovereign states in U.S. courts.99 Like the FTCA, the FSIA 
establishes a framework for determining whether any United States 
court may exercise jurisdiction over any particular case.IOO Under the 
FSIA, a "foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States" unless one of several 
statutorily defined exceptions applies in the case. lUI Thus, phrased 
another way, the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state in the courts of the United States,102 and 
jurisdiction will not be had unless the plaintiff can meet one of the 
exceptions specifically delineated within the text of the FSIA. That is, 
under the Act, a foreign state is presumptively immune from the 
jurisdiction of United States courts and, unless a specified exception 
applies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.lo3 
Hence, a U.S. citizen/plaintiff is jurisdictionally barred from suing a 
foreign government in a U.S. court for injuries suffered from the 
foreign government's activities in outer space unless an exception to 
the FSIA can be satisfied by the injured party as condition precedent 
to bringing suit. 104 
97 Of course, the plaintiff may always travel to the home country to sue in that sovereign 
country's own court system. In addition to the time and travel expenses involved in such an action, 
the plaintiff must rely on the sovereign's municipal law. This option is further complicated by 
the fact that many countries have not waived their immunity to suit within their country. 
98 The FSIA provides for the immunity of the sovereign state, as well as political subdivisions, 
agencies and instrumentalities of the foreign state. Therefore, a foreign state's space agency would 
clearly fall within the purview of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a-b) (1998). 
ggFSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1998). 
100 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1998). 
101 FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1998) (emphasis added). 
102 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) ("We 
think that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that the FSIA be 
the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our court."). 
103See Verlinden B.Y. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1983). 
104 See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 434 (FSIA is sole basis for obtainingjurisdiction 
over foreign state in U.S. court). 
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The FSIA lists a total of seven possible exceptions where, if proven, 
a foreign sovereign state may be sued in a U.S. court.105 Upon first 
reading of the FSIA, four of the exceptions, depending on the fact 
pattern, may arguably allow a suit by a U.S. citizen in a U.S. court 
against a foreign sovereign state for tort based injuries occurring above 
the territorial air space: (1) any case in which the foreign state has 
either expressly or impliedly waived its sovereign immunity;106 (2) in 
any case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 
outside of the United States where the act causes a "direct effect"!07 in 
the United States;108 (3) in a case in which money damages are sought 
for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occur-
ring within the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission 
of that foreign state or employee;J09 or (4) in any case in which a 
foreign state has brought an action in a court within the United States, 
or in a case in which a foreign state intervenes. llo 
The first possible germane exception is the "waiver"lll exemption 
within the FSIA. Case law is replete with examples of when a state may 
have been said to have ''waived'' its jurisdictional defense of immu-
nity.1l2 Such waivers have included an explicit waiver provision in a 
treaty with a foreign country,113 a waiver contained in a contract with 
a private party, ll4 or by other conduct which may evidence an intent to 
waive. ll5 Basically, the foreign state must have taken some affirmative 
step indicating its intent to avail itself of the U.S. court system or 
105The exceptions are delineated at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1606 (1998). 
106 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l) (1998). 
107 "Direct effect" is defined as being any effect which is "substantial" and "foreseeable." Repub-
lic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611-15 (1992). 
lOB See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1998). 
109 See id. § 1605(a)(5). 
110 See id. § 1607. 
III The FSlA distinguishes among three kinds of waiver: 1) waiver of immunity from jurisdic-
tion; 2) waiver of immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution; and 3) waiver 
of immunity from attachment prior to the entry of judgment. See id. § 1610 (a-d). 
112 See, e.g., Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.Supp. 383 (D.NJ. 1979), 
afJ'd, 669 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1983); Flota Martima Browning De Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Cuidad 
De la Habana , 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964); Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611-15. 
113 See Behring Internationa~ 475 F. Supp. at 393. 
114 See S. Rep. No. 94-1310, at 17, Sept. 27, 1976, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 
115 Implicit waivers may be deduced from such conduct as filing an answer or general appear-
ance without raising the jurisdictional defense of immunity. Flota Martima Browning De Cuba, 
335 F.2d at 624-26 (holding ineffective attempt to raise the plea of immunity at later stage in 
litigation) . 
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otherwise waive immunity as a general matter. I Hi While a country may 
waive its immunity through a specific provision of a bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty, such a waiver will not be implied merely by entering into 
treaties generally.ll7 Thus, a claim that a country has entered into 
certain international agreements governing outer space does not mean 
a waiver has occurred for purposes of the FSIA. lIS This is true even 
when a country signs a treaty that enunciates certain general views re-
garding liability principles. 119 The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly ruled 
on this issue, stating that: 
These conventions, however, only set forth substantive rules 
of conduct and state that compensation shall be paid for 
certain wrongs. They do not create private rights of action for 
foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign 
states in the United States courts. Nor do we see how a foreign 
state can waive its immunity under § J605(a)(1) l7y signing an 
international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of 
immunity to suit in the United States courts or even the availability 
of a cause of action in the United States. 120 
Hence, the foundational treaties governing outer space (i.e., the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty and 1972 Convention on Liability) cannot be said 
to constitute waiver under the FSIA waiver exception as there is no 
mention of a domestic waiver of immunity within these treaties. 
The second possible exception, and perhaps most seemingly on 
point, deals with tortious incidents occurring "within the United 
States."121 Under the commercial activity exception to the FSIA (the 
third possible exception discussed more fully below), 122 a foreign state 
may be liable for its commercial activities "outside the territory of the 
United States" having a "direct effect" inside the United States. 123 In 
contrast, however, the "tort" exception of the FSIA (§ 1605(a)(5)), 
116 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707-08 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
117 See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611-15 ("Nor do we see how a foreign state can waive its immunity 
under § 1605(a) (l) by signing an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver 
of immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the 
United States."). 
118 See id. 
119 See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 441-42. 
120 [d. at 442 (emphasis added). 
121 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1998). 
122 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1998). 
m Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 434-39. 
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makes no mention of either "territory outside the United States" or of 
"direct effects" within the United States.124 In light of the contextual 
differences between the "tort" and "commercial activity" exceptions 
within the FSIA, the Supreme Court has expressly held that because 
Congress chose to use specific language in § 1605(a) (2) (i.e., the 
"commercial activity" exception), but not in § 1605(a) (5) (i.e., the 
"tort" exception), the language chosen indicates that the "tort" excep-
tion in § 1605(a) (5) covers only incidents occurring within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States. Phrased another way, 
§ 1605(a) (5) would allow recovery for damages suffered as a result of 
negligent foreign acts within the territorial air space of the United 
States (for example), but nothing beyond that point. 125 This result 
would not be altered by the fact that the alleged tort had "effects" 
within the United States. 
The third possible exception (mentioned briefly above) under the 
FSIA is the "commercial activity" exception.126 In essence, the "com-
mercial activity" exception allows a suit against a foreign sovereign 
when the cause of action of the suit is based upon a "commercial 
activity" of the sovereign, carried on within the United States by the 
foreign state, or upon an act outside the territory of the United States 
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere 
and that causes a direct effect within the United States. J27 With a weak 
and non-existent "tort based" remedy in the FSIA for incidents which 
occurred outside the United States, the attempt was made to utilize 
the "commercial exception" for actions sounding in tort which oc-
curred outside the territorial confines of the United States, by claiming 
some commercial nexus with the United States. 
However, the recent Supreme Court's decision in Nelson v. Saudi 
Arabia destroyed the possibility of recovery for outer space "torts" 
against a foreign sovereign under the FSIA128 In Nelson, the plaintiffs 
(a married couple) sued Saudi Arabia in federal district court for 
personal injuries resulting from Scott Nelson's alleged detention and 
torture in Saudi Arabia. 129 The plaintiffs argued that he had been 
124 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1998). 
125From the outset, § 1605(a)(5) was ruled inapplicable were the tort or injury occurred 
outside the United States. See, e.g., Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (detention of hostages in U.S. embassy in Iran held not to have 
occurred within the United States). 
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
127 See id. 
128 507 U.S. 349 (1993). 
129 [d. at 352-53. 
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recruited in the United States as a monitoring systems engineer for a 
Saudi Arabian hospital but was detained and tortured once in Saudi 
Arabia. 130 The plaintiffs further alleged that the court had jurisdiction 
because, as Scott Nelson was initially recruited in the United States, 
they had established a "commercial activity" which occurred in the 
United States under Section 1605 of the FSIAl31 Saudi Arabia moved 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming sovereign immunity and 
arguing that no exception within the FSIA allowed for such jurisdic-
tion.132 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held that 
the plaintiff's suit could proceed under the FSIA as the action was, in 
some part, due to a "commercial activity" of Saudi Arabia, namely the 
recruitment of Nelson in the United States for employment. 133 The 
court held that "there was a sufficient nexus between those commercial 
activities and the wrongful acts that had allegedly injured the Nel-
sons."134 
Almost immediately following the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, several 
legal commentators opined that the ruling would, in essence, "open 
the door" for the recovery of tort-based injuries committed abroad 
when the plaintiff could point to any colorable nexus with commercial 
activity occurring within the United States. l35 However, the Supreme 
Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the "commercial activ-
ity" provision of the FSIA.136 The Court took a strict reading of the 
verbiage of the exception, noting that the words "based upon" required 
that the cause of action be directly (and not indirectly) based upon 
the commercial activity.137 The court then noted that "wrongful arrest, 
imprisonment and torture could not qualify," ipso facto, as a commer-
cial act by a sovereign.138 That is, a foreign state only engages in a 
"commercial activity" for purposes of the FSIA when it acts in the 
manner of a private player within the market. 139 Finally, in doing away 
with the plaintiffs' claim that Saudi Arabia was also negligent in failing 
130 See id. 
131 See id. at 358. 
132 See id. at 354. 
133 See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 355. 
134Id. 
135 See, e.g., R. Romano, Extension of the Commercial Activity Exception of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act to a Human Rights Violation: Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 5 N.Y. INT'L REv. 24 (1992). 
136 See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356-61. 
137Id. at 357. 
138Id. at 361. 
139Id. 
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to warn Mr. Nelson of the perils to which he was subsequently sub-
jected, the Court stated that "this is merely a semantic ploy" and "would 
effectively thwart the Act's manifest purpose."140 
Therefore, in light of the inapplicability of any exception under the 
FSIA, absent a waiver of immunity by the sovereign or some strong 
"commercial activity" within the United States, it would be almost 
impossible to sue a foreign sovereign in a U. S. court for any injuries 
resulting from the negligent conduct of that sovereign in outer space. 
Thus, regardless of whether the United States is the responsible tort-
feasor (under the FTCA), or a foreign country (under the FSIA), the 
suit would be jurisdictionally barred in any United States court. 141 
Based upon the foregoing, the court would not have the requisite 
subject matter jurisdiction needed to entertain the action under the 
FTCA and/or FSIA142 In light of the nonexistent available domestic 
remedies for a United States citizen, this article now turns briefly to 
the international rules of compensation for tort-based injuries occur-
ring in outer space. 
C. Actions by US. Citizens for Damages Suffered in Outer Space by 
Foreign Governments: Application of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
and the 1972 Convention on Liability 
As discussed above, we must now briefly turn to international law 
governing the issue of liability in outer space. The 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty delineates the foundational rules concerning outer space. 143 
One of the most fundamental principles arising out of the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty is that no country has jurisdiction over the sun, moon, 
or any other celestial body; as such, regions of space are not subject to 
any national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use 
or occupation, or by any other means. 144 More importantly, the second 
foundational principle of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is that each 
140Id. at 363. 
141 See supm notes 27-41 and accompanying text. 
142Id. 
143 See generally 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note II. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is 
frequently described as the Constitution of outer space. See, e.g., Pamela L. Meredith, Comment, 
The Legality of a High-Technology Missile Defense Systern, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 422 n.44 (1984); 
see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Space Colonialization and the Law, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 7, 
7-8 (1990). 
144 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. VI. 
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country is generally liable for damage caused by the objects and people 
that it puts in to space. 145 
Specifically, Article VII of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches ... an object into 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies 
... is internationally liable for damage to another State Party 
to the Treaty orto its natural or juridical persons by such object 
or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. 146 
Thus, one of the basic principles clearly delineates that in the sov-
ereignless regions of outer space, each state party to the treaty will be 
liable on the international plane147 to another foreign state or persons 
of the foreign state for damages resulting from its outer space activities. 
However, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was silent as to the rights of a 
citizen when that citizen's own country was the responsible tortfeasor. 
Due to this silence, several construed the international rules as not 
applying when the injured party was a citizen of the sovereign who 
caused the injuries. 148 As one federal judge wrote,149 "the basic principle 
is that in the sovereignless reaches of outer space, each state party to 
the treaty will retain jurisdiction over its own objects and persons. "150 
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty was soon supplemented by a second 
treaty, the 1972 Convention on Liability, lSI which wen t further in clari-
fying the rules regarding compensation for tort-based injuries which 
occur in "outer space." Generally, the 1972 Convention provides for 
both "strict" (i.e., absolute) liability and fault-based liability.152 First, the 
140 I d. art. VII. 
146Id. (emphasis added). 
147 By international plane, it is meant that the claims are the national claims of each sovereign 
state. It is a well established principle of international law that individual citizens have no 
individually enforceable rights under a treaty on the international plane unless so provided for 
by the specific treaty at issue. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 374-78. Thus, under the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Convention on Liability, individual claimants have no right per 
se to file a claim. The right belongs to each signatory country. 
148 See, e.g., Beattie, 756 F.2d at 91. 
149 See id. at 91. As discussed above, the Beattie case was the only case directly dealing with the 
"foreign country" exception to the FTCA and its relation to Antarctica prior to Smith li. United 
States. 
100Id. at 100. 
J5J See 1972 Convention on Liability, supra, note 12. 
J02 See id. art. II-IV. 
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1972 Convention states that the launching stateI53 shall be absolutely 
liable, without proof of fault, when damage giving rise to the incident 
is caused while on the surface of the earth (e.g., launch pad) 154 or 
caused to another aircraft in flight. I55 Second, the 1972 Convention 
states that a launching state will be jointly and severally liable for any 
damage caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth.I56 
Third, the 1972 Convention also clarified the impression that the 
international rules of liability should not be applied when the injured 
party was a citizen of the sovereign causing the injury. 157 This exclusion 
stems from the application of a venerable customary international law 
principle which specifies that, except in narrow circumstances, coun-
tries on the international plane should refrain from dealing or inter-
fering with the relationship between a sovereign state and its citi-
zenry.I5S Thus, Article VII of the 1972 Convention provides: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage 
caused by a space object of a launching state to ... nationals 
of that launching state .... 159 
Hence, under the above international law exclusion/exception, U.S. 
citizens injured by the negligent acts of the United States lack an 
international law remedy. As this citizen would not have a remedy 
against the United States under the FfCA, the injured party entirely 
lacks a consistent and adequate forum for the redress of his or her 
injuries. 
A U.S. citizen injured by a foreign sovereign fares only slightly better. 
As the FSIA would bar a suit by the U.S. citizen in U.S. Court, these 
individuals must rely on the rights provided for by international law. 160 
Under that law, these citizens would be entitled to present their claim 
for adjudication through the United States under the terms ofthe 1972 
Convention. I6I Specifically, Article IX of the 1972 Convention provides 
153The "launching state" includes the state which launches the object, the state which procures 
the launching, the state from whose territory it is launched, and the state from whose facility it 
is launched. See id. art. I(b). 
154 See id. art. III. 
155 See id. art. II. 
156 See 1972 Convention on Liability, supra note 12, art. II. 
157 See id. art. VII. 
158NANDASIRIjASENTULIYANA & Roy LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 101 (1979). 
159 1972 Convention on Liability, supra note 12, art. VII. 
160 See supra notes 99-143 and accompanying text. 
161 1972 Convention on Liability, supra note 12, art. IX. 
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that a claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a 
launching State through diplomatic channels. Thus, under the inter-
national law doctrine of diplomatic protection,162 the U.S. Government 
would take up the case of its citizen on the international plane.163 
However, there is no guarantee that the United States will raise the 
request for compensation on the international plane. Clearly then, a 
reliance on municipal U.S. laws (FTCA and FSIA) , or on international 
laws, leaves the U.S. citizen with little to no chance of recovery or 
recourse for injuries received in outer space. 
Indeed, the Liability Convention has never even been formally in-
voked. The nearest a country came to invoking the Convention dealt 
with the crash of Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear powered satellite, which 
was said to have contained up to a 100 pounds of uranium 235.164 On 
September 18, 1977, Cosmos 954 began to drop from its orbit as a 
result of "unexplained decompression." The satellite eventually re-en-
tered the earth's atmosphere and broke into thousands of pieces over 
an area in the North West Territories of Canada. While Canada made 
a claim against the USSR for damages caused by Cosmos 954 in the 
amount of $14 million, the international rules were only used as 
"guiding principles. "IG5 Mter years of diplomatic negotiation, the USSR 
paid Canada only $3 million, and rejected a plea for the reimburse-
ment of environmental clean-up costS.166 Thus, these international 
rules can hardly be said to be adequate, reliable, or consistent. 
III. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RECOVERY, CIRCUMVENTION OF THE 
FTCA AND FSIA PROHIBITIONS 
In light of the law presented above, some thought must be given to 
how a U.S. citizen may seek recovery/compensation for damages de-
spite the current domestic law exclusions as contained in the FTCA 
and FSIA. A few alternative theories of recovery merit discussion. 
162 "Diplomatic protection" refers to the right of a country to represent the claims of its citizenry 
as its own on the international plane. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting 
to diplomatic action, a state is in reality asserting its own rights. 
163 See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 374-75, 397-401. 
164 Alexander Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of Satellite Accidents, 10 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 78 (1984). 
165Documents regarding the claim by Canada against the Soviet Union for damage caused by 
Cosmos 954 are reproduced beginning at 181.L.M. 899 (1979). Specific documentation regarding 
Canada's demand for payment from the Soviet Union can be found at 18 I.L.M. 899, 899-909, 
912,920-22,929-30. 
166 See id. 
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A. Creative Interpretations as to Where the Tort Occurred 
As discussed above, under both the FSIA and the FTCA, in order to 
sustain a personal injury action in U.S. court, the plaintiff must show 
that the tortious acts giving rise to the injury occurred within the 
territorial confines of the United States. 167 Thus, to the extent one can 
establish that the tortious act occurred (at least in part) within the 
territorial confines of the United States, that plaintiff may avoid the 
"foreign country" prohibition contained in the FTCA, or satisfy the 
"local tort" exception (which permits suit when satisfied) under the 
FSIA.168 
In re Paris Air Crash Case oj March 3, 1974 is illustrative of this 
approach. l69 On March 3,1974, shortly after takeoff from Paris, France, 
a Douglas DC-I0 passenger airplane owned and operated by Turkish 
Air Lines crashed in France, destroying the plane and killing all occu-
pants on-board.17°The survivors then sued multiple defendants, includ-
ing the United States under the FTCA. The Department of Justice 
sought dismissal of the U.S. as a party, claiming that under the "foreign 
country" exception, it could not be sued under the terms of the FTCA. 
In disposing of this issue, the court declined to accept the Department 
of Justice's request for dismissal. In doing so, the court stated that all 
of the acts or failures to act of the United States upon which the 
plaintiffs rely were alleged to have actually occurred in the United 
States "by the wrongful approval, certification, inspection, and the like, 
of the plane, or the failure to do so .... "171 This decision was in 
accordance with earlier Supreme Court pronouncements on the sub-
ject. 172 
Thus, to the extent the i~uries suffered because of outer space 
activities can be tied to some activity which occurred in the territorial 
air space or land of the U.S. (which was not a "discretionary func-
tion"),173 the plain tiff may successfully argue that the tort actually oc-
167 For description of FICA, see supra notes 27-97 and accompanying text, and for description 
of FSIA, see supra notes 99-143 and accompanying text. 
168 See id. 
169 399 F.Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
170 See id. at 735-36. 
171 [d. at 737. 
172 "Under the FTCA, a tort claim arises at the place where the negligent act or omission 
occurred and not where the negligence had its 'operative effect,' (i.e., the situs of the injury)." 
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,9-10 (1962). 
173For other examples of this approach, see Orlikow v. U.S., 682 1". Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1988) 
(cause of action for tort based upon human experimentation in Canada did not arise in foreign 
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cUfred not in the sovereignless regions of outer space, but within the 
territorial confines of the United States.174 Another example of this 
approach can be seen in revisiting the Space Shuttle Challenger inci-
dent mentioned at the outset of this paper. The Challenger's ultimate 
destruction was said to be based upon faulty "o-rings," the gasket-like 
devices which were designed to help seal the joints between the sec-
tions ofthe shuttle's two solid-fuel rocket boosters. 175 The fact that such 
a part must be ordered, procured, inspected, tested, and approved 
within the United States would allow those injured to potentially avoid 
the FSIA/ITCA pitfalls mentioned above.176 
Another creative interpretation as to where the tort occurred has to 
do with the issue of the delimitation of space. 177 As the reader will 
recall, there are competing theories as to the actual point where the 
territorial air space ends and outer space begins. 178 Under the "major-
ity" definition/demarcation of outer space, the plaintiff would have to 
allege and prove that the accident occurred before the orbit perigee 
had been reached. This would obviously be a question of fact and a 
battle of experts may ensue over the ultimate resolution of the case. 
B. Alternative Contractual Arrangements 
Alternative contractual arrangements between countries could fea-
sibly alter the existing rules of compensation as well. That is, if during 
ajoint space activity, participating countries each agreed to a different 
country, since activity was supervised and funded in Washington, D.C.); see also Glickman v. 
United States, 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (administration of electric shocks to individuals 
physically located in France outside the foreign country exception to the FTCA as program was 
run from Washington, D.C.). 
174However, the prudent practitioner must also be aware of another FTCA exception/pitfall 
in this context, namely the "discretionary function" exception. The discretionary function excep-
tion dictates that claims are excluded from the FTCA when they arise out of the exercise or 
performance of a discretionary function by a government employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). In 
United States v. Varig, 467 U.S. 797 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a claim against the FAA 
for negligent certification and issuance of permits was baITed under the "discretionary function" 
exception. 
175 See joseph Trento, Why Challenger Was Doomed, LA. TIMES, jan. 18, 1987, at 12. 
176The claims which were ultimately rejected in court were not rejected because of the "inap-
plicability" of the FTCA to outer space. Mter all, at the time of the suits, the FTCA was thought 
to apply in outer space. See supra note 54. The only unsettled claim was ultimately rejected because 
of the Feres Doctrine, which prohibits service members from suing over tortious injuries which 
were incurred "incident to service." See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text (II. Distinction Between "Territorial Air Space" 
and "Outer Space"). 
178 See id. 
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set of compensation rules. Unfortunately, the recent International 
Space Station Agreementl79 illustrates that the "compensation rules" 
are not lightly altered. Article 17 of the International Space Station 
Agreement states that "the Partner States, as well as the ESA,180 shall 
remain liable in accordance with the Liability Convention."181 Hence, 
rather than changing or modifying the compensation scheme laid out 
in the 1972 Convention on Liability, the International Space Station 
Agreement merely incorporates it by reference. 182 
C. Private Bills of Relief by Congress 
Individuals seeking redress for a wrongful act can petition Congress 
to pass a private bill providing a special grant of relief, just as they could 
prior to the enactment of the FCTA.I~3 Depending on the popularity 
or "public opinion" regarding the particular space activity, the private 
bill of relief mayor may not be successful. However, the problems with 
private bills of relief (as a predictable legal remedy) are many: first, 
not all persons have equal access to or influence with their particular 
Congressman; second, the Congress is not as suited for determining 
the facts in a judicial manner, as is a federal district court; third, as 
space activities increase in the coming years, there will be no expecta-
tion of relieffor clearly negligen t actions of the United States in space. 
D. Product Liability Actions Against Private Parties 
A brief word should also be said about the viability of product 
liability suits. Many commercial activities today utilize a variety of com-
179 Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Governments of 
Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and the Government 
of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of 
the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, Sept. 29, 1988, art. 1 [copy of agreement on file 
with author and the Georgetown University Law Library-International Collection) [hereinafter 
International Space Station Agreement). The International Space Station Agreement is an agree-
ment between the United States, Japan, Canada, and the governments of the member states of 
the European Space Agency regarding the maintenance and operation of the International Space 
Station. The original agreement was superceded by the Space Station Intergovernmental Agree-
ment, which entered into force Jan. 29,1998. See 37 LL.M. 1495, 1998 U.S. Treaty Actions (1998). 
For up-to-date information on the status of the International Space Station, see the NASA 
International Space Station Web page at <http://www.nasa.gov>. 
180 International Space Station Agreement, supra note 179, art. 4. ESA stands for the European 
Space Agency. 
lSI [d. art. 17. 
182 See id. 
183 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,24-25 (1953); see generally Walter Gelhorn & Louis 
Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United States, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1955). 
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ponents provided by the private sector. As such, the FTCA/FSIA would 
not be applicable as a bar between a suit between two private parties, 
and private causes of action would still exist as between these parties. 
Indeed, as discussed briefly below, such suits have been largely success-
ful throughout the history of the space program. As a result of one of 
the earliest space exploration tragedies, for example, Ms. Betty Grissom 
sued North American Rockwell, the makers of the Apollo I craft, on 
which her husband and two other astronauts died on January 7, 
1967. 184 Ms. Grissom settled the case with North American Rockwell for 
$350,000, and the widows of the two other victims each received 
$150,000. 185 The relatives of the Space Shuttle Challenger victims also 
received product liability settlements from the maker of the faulty 
O-ring, Morton Thiokol. 18(i While private product liability actions are 
beyond the subject matter of this paper, the reader should note that 
this remains a possible avenue of redress to injured parties and their 
families. The reader should further note that the government is insu-
lated from secondary liability in this area (based upon such doctrines 
such as subrogation or indemnification) vis-a-vis the widespread use of 
cross waiver of liability contracts when private companies are involved 
in the space activity.187 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
After reviewing applicable domestic and international laws currently 
available, one is led to the inescapable conclusion that the present 
compensation scheme is wholly and utterly inadequate. First, under 
the FSIA and FTCA, the ability to sue at all boils down to, in essence, 
the height of the vehicle at the time the incident giving rise to liability 
occurs. These types of arbitrary distinctions have been criticized both 
as they applied to the sea and territorial air space. Secondly, and more 
importantly, in light of the lack of any tort standard in outer space 
whatsoever, it is becoming increasingly clear, as space exploration and 
travel continues, that a federal statutory body of law be promulgated 
to govern all U.S.-based space liabilities and remedies. The needed 
body of law would not only cover the compensation scheme itself, but 
184 See Judi Hasson, Shuttle Suits Only A Matter of Time, UPI, Feb. 16, 1986, at 2. 
185 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
186 See Theresa M. Foley, Family of Challenger Pilot Files $15-Million Claim Against NASA, 
AVIATION WEEK, July 21, 1986, at 29. 
187 See Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (CSLA), 49 USC §§ 70101-70119. 
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also what law applies to a given action in space. Additionally, by prom-
ulgating a statute governing conduct in outer space, Congress may 
define the appropriate degree and standard of conduct.1ss Obviously, 
what constitutes the reasonable actions of a person of ordinary sensi-
bilities (in defining the standard of care), should differ substantially 
from that standard of care back on earth. 
Alternatively, at a minimum, to avoid future inequitable results such 
as occurred to the plaintiffs in Smith v. United States (under the ITCA) 
and Saudi Arabia v. Nelson (under the FSIA), both statutes should be 
amended to provide for liability based upon incidents occuring in the 
sovereign less regions of outer space. In lieu of this, at least as it relates 
to the FTCA, the courts should be willing to effectuate the congres-
sional purpose of '~ustice and fair play" to the application of the ITCA 
to those unique areas, areas like outer space-clearly beyond the con-
sciousness of the drafters in 1946. 
188 That is, the current "reasonable man" test of negligence may be a very high standard when 
dealing with the fragile and confined environment of vehicles in space. Congress may wish to 
reduce the "reasonable man" standard of care to continue encouraging the exploration and use 
of outer space. 
